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WHO CAN BE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE UNRESOLVED ENIGMA
By

CHARLES GORDON*

The approach of our 45th presidential election evokes once again
the question of constitutional eligibility. Under the presidential qualification clause of the Constitution, only "natural-born" citizens are
qualified for this highest office. It is clear enough that native-born
citizens are eligible and that naturalized citizens are not.' The recurring
doubts relate to those who have acquired United States citizenship
through birth abroad to American parents. Can they be regarded as
"natural-born" within the contemplation of the Constitution?
In the early stages of the 1968 presidential campaign this question
became increasingly urgent, because Governor George Romney of
Michigan was a leading contender for the Republican nomination.
Governor Romney was born to American citizens in a Mormon colony
in Chihuahua, Mexico, and came to the United States with his parents
when he was five. Oddly enough, other Republican candidates in recent
years have confronted similar difficulties. Barry Goldwater was born
in the Territory of Arizona, before it became a state. Governor Christian D. Herter of Massachusetts, a potential candidate in 1952 and
1960, and also Secretary of State during the latter years of the Eisenhower administration, was born to American parents who were studying art in France. Of course, this problem has also faced Democratic
candidates. For example, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., once discussed
as a possible candidate, was born at the summer home of his parents on
Campobello Island, New Brunswick, Canada.
Speculations concerning the presidential qualification clause have
thus arisen from time to time. The problem has occasionally been
mentioned by the courts. It has also provoked discussion of schoolboys and scholars and inquiries to various government agencies.
* General Counsel, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Adjunct
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Coauthor of Gordon and
Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure. The views expressed are the author's
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Justice.
1. The naturalized citizen's ineligibility for the Presidency is mentioned in
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165, 177 (1964) ; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S.
654, 658 (1946) ; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673 (1944) ; Luria v.
United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
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But until now no direct confrontation has materialized, and there has
never been a definitive judicial decision. Therefore, the doubts have
persevered and unquestionably will continue until some way to end
them is found. Because of the continuing, and doubtless increasing,
public interest in this problem, I believe a reexamination at this time
may be helpful.

1.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

SETTING

The constitutional provisions prescribing the President's qualifications appear in Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the United States
Constitution, which declares:
No Person except a natural-born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,
shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age
of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within
the United States.
From today's vantage point in history, 180 years after the Constitution was adopted, several aspects of this formulation are puzzling.
In the first place, the Framers here and at other points in the Constitution referred to citizens of the United States, but nowhere specified
who were to be regarded as citizens.' This silence may perhaps be
explained by a desire to bypass troublesome issues, such as the status
of the Negro slaves and the distinction between state and national
citizenship. 3 In any event, as originally adopted, the Constitution's
only oblique and inconclusive reference to the acquisition of citizenship
was its grant of authority to Congress "to establish an uniform rule
of naturalization." 4 This omission to define citizenship persevered until
1868, when the fourteenth amendment was adopted. We shall examine that amendment later.
A second puzzling aspect of the constitutional prescription is its
naked, again undefined, reference to the "natural-born." The presidential qualification clause is the sole instance of this term's appearance in the Constitution.' The only explanation for the use of this term
is the apparent belief of the Framers that its connotation was clear.
With the passage of the years this has proved a mistaken assumption.
However, any reading of this language must take into account the
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
2 (qualifications for members of House of Representatives - citizen of the United States) ; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (qualifications for Senators - citizen of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1
(judicial power extends to controversies involving citizens of different states). In
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165 (1874), Chief Justice Waite
observed that ..."[T]he Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe
who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States, yet there were
necessarily such citizens without such provision. There cannot be a nation without
a people."
3. See Gordon, The Citizen and the State, 53 Gzo. L.J. 315, 318, 334 (1965).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The original colonies had naturalization laws.
The Articles of Confederation made no provision for naturalization, and left citizenship to the various States. See Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch.583, 645-46 (N.Y. 1844).
5. The twelfth amendment in effect adopted this language by disqualifying for
the Vice Presidency any person "constitutionally ineligible to the office of President."
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admonition that an "isolated phrase in the United States Constitution
[cannot be] rigidly interpreted without regard to other relevant pro' 6
visions and to time and circumstance.
A third puzzling element of the constitutional declaration is its
specification that the presidential aspirant must have "been fourteen
years a resident of the United States." If the Framers were speaking
only of the native-born, this limitation would hardly have been necessary. It can doubtless be urged that this residence qualification was
intended to relate only to the portion of the qualification clause dealing
with citizens of the United States at the time the Constitution was
adopted. But while the language of the qualification clause obviously
includes this group, it is not in context limited to them. Indeed, it
seems consistent with a supposition that the "natural-born" qualification was intended to include those who had acquired United States
citizenship at birth abroad.7
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 furnish
no clues to the underlying purpose. The Convention was writing on
a clear slate, since the Articles of Confederation made no provision
for a Chief Executive.' Proposals for the establishment of a national
executive were advanced at the outset of the Convention. 9 None of these
prescribed qualifications. The Convention soon resolved in principle
to adopt a government with three branches: legislative, executive, and
judicial.'" The discussions regarding the executive concerned his title,"
powers, 12 term of office,'" and manner of selection.' 4 There was virtually no discussion of qualifications. 5
6. Goldberg, Law and the United Nations, 52 A.B.A.J. 813, 814 (1966).
7. For a discussion of the 14 year residence requirement, as contemplating establishment of an identification with the United States see 2 J. STORY, COMM4NTARIS ON
THE CONSTITUTION §

1479 (5th ed. 1891).

See also E.

CORWIN,

Tim

PRESIDENT:

AND POWERS 33, 330 (4th rev. ed. 1957), which discusses questions raised
regarding whether President Hoover satisfied the 14 year residence requirement.
8. Despite the silence of the Articles of Confederation, the Congress elected an
officer known as President of the Congress. He was a presiding officer who had no
executive power. See 5 J. EIOt, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 572
(2d ed. 1845) [hereinafter cited as 5 ELLIOT'S DABATzs]. The Constitutional provisions regarding the Presidency generally were patterned after the New York constitution of 1777, which, however, had no "natural-born" qualifications. CONSTITUTION
OP THE UNITAD STATES op AmmLcA (rev. & ann. 1963), S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 425 (1963).
9. These were comprehensive proposals for matters to be considered by the
Convention, and included those of Randolph (1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON TI FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 143, 144 (2d ed. 1836))
[hereinafter cited as 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES];
Pinckney (Id. at 145, 148) and Hamilton (Id. at 179). Another omnibus proposal
by Paterson made no provision for an executive, but was quickly discarded (Id.
at 180, 181).
10. Id.at 150-51.
11. Hamilton would have designated him governor. Id. at 179. Other proposals
were to designate him as President, with the title "His Excellency." E.g., id. at 145,
148, 228, 283.
12. See id. at 144, 182, 214, 219, 228.
13. Until the final stages of the Convention most proposals were for a single 7
year term, without eligibility for reelection. Id. at 182, 212, 219. Indeed this was
provided in one of the latest drafts approved by the Convention. Id. at 228. Hamilton
favored service by the executive during good behavior, without time limitation.
Id. at 179.
14. There were several proposals for selection of the executive by the national
legislature. Id. at 144, 222, 228.
15. The first mention of qualifications was a proposal by Delegate Mason, after
the Convention's proceedings were well under way, to instruct the Committee on Detail
OF'IC

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVIII

During its deliberations, the Constitutional Convention referred
to a five man committee, known as the Committee on Detail, various
resolutions including those for the establishment of a national executive. 6 Thereafter, the Committee on Detail reported to the Convention
and presented a document described as, "Draft of a Constitution."' 7
This draft included provision for an executive, but did not initially
prescribe his qualifications.'" The Convention then debated and substantially approved the proposals for the national executive.'" However,
this and other portions of the proposed Constitution were then referred
to a Committee of Eleven, one member from each state, which revised
the draft, presumably to conform with the sentiments expressed by
the delegates. 20 However, their proposal included for the first time
the requirements now incorporated in the presidential qualification
clause, including the requirement that the President be a "naturalborn" citizen. 2 1 The Committee of Eleven did not explain why this
new language had been added. The Convention approved this portion
of the proposals without debate.
The draft Constitution was then
referred to a second Committee of Five, known as the Committee on
Style and Arrangement or the Committee on Revision.28 That Committee retained the presidential qualification clause without comment,
and without substantial change. 24 It was adopted in this form, and
without any debate, by the Convention.25 Indeed, no explanation of
the origin or purpose of the presidential qualification clause appears
anywhere in the recorded deliberations of the Convention. 6
to consider for all executive, judicial and legislative offices under the new government
"qualifications of landed property and citizenship," and for disqualifying persons indebted to the United States. Id. at 219-20. Mason explained that this provision was
necessary because undesirable persons had been elected to state legislatures. 5 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES 370. The debate centered on the proposed disqualification of debtors. Id. 371.
Of course, the property and debt qualifications ultimately were rejected by the Convention. See 1 EuIOT's DEBATES at 223.
16. The members of the Committee on Detail were Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham,
Ellsworth, and Wilson. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 217.
17. Id. at 224-30.
18. Id. at 228.
19. Id. at 267.
20. Id. at 280.
21. In a partial report on Aug. 22, 1787, the Committee of Eleven provided that
the President "shall be of the age of thirty-five years, and a citizen of the United
States, and shall have been an inhabitant thereof for twenty-one years." 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES 256-57; 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 462. However, in a later report on Sept. 4,
1787, the Committee presented, without explanation, a revised presidential qualification
clause, substantially in the form it now appears in the Constitution, including the
reference to "a natural born citizen." 1 ELLIOT's DEBATES 289; 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 507.
22. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 289; 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 507.
23. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 295; 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 530. This Committee consisted
of Johnson, Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, Madison and King.
24. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 302; 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs 536.

25. 1 ELLIOT'S

DEBATES

297-317; 5

ELLIOT'S DEBATES

535-53.

26. See note 20 supra. One author declares that the "natural-born" qualification
was intended to exclude aliens "by birth and blood." Morse, Natural-Born Citizen
of the United States, 66 ALBANY L.J. 99, 100 (1904). A similar purpose is found by

Story in his 2

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

§§ 1479-80 (1891), that is, to

exclude "ambitious foreigners." A similar expression appears in 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW * 274. None of these comments cites any supporting evidence. See also 2 G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

193 (1882).
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It has been suggested,27 quite plausibly, that this language was
inserted in response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington,
and probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to
provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the
administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American army shall
not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen."8
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose
subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay. 9 Another theory is that the Jay
letter, and the resulting constitutional provision, responded to rumors
that the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign
monarch."0 In any event, the Committee of Eleven shortly thereafter
proposed, and the Convention adopted, the language restricting the
Presidency to "natural-born" citizens."1 This language appears no2
where else in the Constitution.1
II.

THE BRITISH

ANTECEDENTS

We are left therefore with the conviction that the Framers were
referring to the natural-born within the contemporary frame of understanding in 1787. There were no conspicuous colonial precedents.
Therefore it seems patent that those who uttered this term were influenced by the usage in the mother country.33
In 1787, the Colonies had just won their independence. But they
had retained the language, the culture, and the traditions of Great
Britain. And their legal system was grounded in the English common
law. This was not infallibly true, since some of the common law precepts did not flourish in the more liberal climate of the new country.
Thus, the common law doctrine of indissoluble allegiance to the Crown
27. Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789, 40 JOHNS

UNIVXRSrTY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIXNCE No.

HOPKINS

4, p. 137

(1922).
The Thach work is a scholarly and comprehensive discussion of the formulation
of
the constitutional provisions dealing with the Presidency. Another illuminating, but
regrettably unannotated, discussion of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention will be found in Means, Is Presidency Barred to Americans Born Abroad?,
U.S. NEws & WORLD RnP., Vol. 39, No. 26, at 26-30, Dec. 23, 1955, reprinted in
113 CONG. Rc. H5776-H5779 (daily ed. May 18, 1967).
28. U.S. DEPT. o1, STATs, 4 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY O

THIE CONSTITUTION OP

TH4 UNITED STATES 237 (1905).
29. See note 27 supra.
30. Means, supra note 27, at 26, 28, 113 CONG. Rtc. at H5777-H5778.
31. One author has suggested, without any supporting citation, that in the light
of the expected immigration from foreign countries, the purpose of the
language was
"to provide that the President should at least be the child
of citizens owing allegiance
to the United States at the time of his birth." Morse, Natural-Born Citizen
of the
United States, 66 ALBANY L.J. 99-100 (1904). See also note 26 supra.
32. See note 5 supra.
33. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898); Kennedy
v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657,
660
(1927); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874); Ludlam v. Ludlam,
26 N.Y. 356, 361 (1863) ; Lynch v. Clarke, I Sandf. Ch. 583, 645-47, 660 (N.Y.
1844);
Means, supra note 27, at 27, 113 CONG. Ric. at H5777.
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eventually was not followed in the United States. 4 But this deviation
developed in the absence of any specific provision in the Constitution.
It seems reasonable to assume, on the other hand, that when the
Framers used an undefined common law term, e.g., "natural-born," they
must have intended to accept the connotation of the common law, as it
had developed in 1787." Indeed, in passing on the status of a person
born in the United States, the Supreme Court remarked on the absence
of a constitutional definition of citizenship, and observed :"
In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light
of the common law, the principles and history of which were
familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.
The British legal system had indeed long known of natural-born
subjects. It is indisputable that the jus soli, under which nationality
is determined by the place of birth, was always the basic tenet of the
English common law. 7 This was a principle which emerged out of
feudal concepts of allegiance and was peculiarly fitted to the isolated
society of England in the early days of the common law.8" It has
always been true that a person born in the realm was a natural-born
subject.
There has been some debate whether the common law also encompassed the jus sanguinis, a product of the civil law and followed
in most European countries, under which nationality could be transmitted by descent at the moment of birth.39 The fact is that the issue
did not arise in the static feudal society, since there was little or no
travel to foreign nations and children were not being born to British
parents abroad. But the problem
provoked discussions as mobility
40
and foreign trade increased.

In 1343, the situation of the foreign-born children of British subjects was discussed in Parliament. There was general agreement that
the status of such children should be clarified in order to eliminate any
doubts as to their rights of inheritance as Englishmen. The enactment
of legislation was delayed by the ravages of the plague in England.41
However, in 1350, Parliament did enact a law for the express purpose
of resolving existing doubts, which declared that the children born
34. See Gordon, The Citizen and the State, 53 Ggo. L.J. 315, 317 et seq. (1965).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898). See also A.
COCKBURN, NATIONALITY 12 (1869); F. VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED
STATES 32 (1904) ; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 645-52 (N.Y. 1844) ; Ludlam
v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 361 (1863). In the latter case, the court noted that the
constitution of the State of New York also referred to citizens of the state without
defining that term.
37. Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 660 (1927) ; United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 154 (Dean Gavit ed. 1941);
A. COCKBURN, NATIONALITY 6 (1869) [hereinafter cited as A. COCKBURN].
38. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 707 (1898) (dissenting
opinion); A. COCKBURN 7 (1869).
39. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 666 (1898); Ludlam v.
Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 362 (1863); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 645-52 (N.Y.
1844) ; A. COCKBURN 7.
40. A. COCKBURN 7.
41. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898); A. COCKBURN 708.

1968]

PRESIDENTIAL QUALIFICATION

beyond the sea to British subjects "shall have and enjoy the same
benefits and advantages" as their parents in regard to the right of
inheritance.4 2 The first reference to such children as natural-born
subjects apparently was in a 1677 law, which dealt with the children
of persons who had fled to foreign countries during the Cromwell
era, and declared such persons to be natural-born subjects."3 More
general legislation was enacted in 1708, 4 and it provided that the
foreign-born children of natural-born British subjects "shall be deemed,
adjudged and taken to be natural-born subjects of this kingdom, to
all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever." This legislation
was further extended in 1773 to grant status as natural-born subjects
to the granchildren of natural-born subjects,: thus precluding the transmission of British nationality by descent or inheritance beyond the
second generation. 5
In viewing this development, the leading British authorities agree
that under the early common law, status as a natural-born subject
probably was acquired only by those born within the realm, but that
the statutes described above enabled natural-born subjects to transmit
equivalent status at birth to the children born to them outside of
the kingdom. These are the views expressed in Coke on Littleton,46
Blackstone, 7 Cockburn,48 and Dicey.49 The latter is most explicit in
stating that a natural-born subject "means a British subject who became
a British subject at the time of his birth" and that this designation
includes a person born abroad whose father or paternal grandfather
was born in British dominions.5"
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS AFTER ADOPTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION

If the constitutional

reference to natural-born

citizens were

assessed only in the light of the previous British usage, it would present
little difficulty. "Natural-born citizen" doubtless was regarded as
equivalent to "natural-born subject," adjusted for the transition from
monarchy to republic. 1 The Framers certainly were aware of the
long-settled British practice, reaffirmed in recent legislation in England,52 which unquestionably "applied to the colonies before the
War of Independence, '5 3 to grant full status of natural-born subjects
42. 25 Edw. III, c. 2 (1350).
43. 29 Car. II, c. 6, § 1 (1677).
44. 7 Anne, c. 5, § 3 (1708). This legislation was substantially reenacted by 4
Geo. II, c. 21 (1731).
45. 13 Geo. III, c. 21 (1773).
46. 1 CoKX ON LTrTLAON 8a, 129a (F. Hargrave & C. Butler ed. 1853).
47. W. BLACKSTONS, COMMXNTAMRIS 154-57 (Dean Gavit ed. 1941).
48. A. COCKBURN 9. Lord Cockburn observes that if the 1350 statute "had only
been declaratory of the common law, the subsequent legislation on the subject would
have been unnecessary."
49. A. Dicsy, THZ CONFLICT OF LAWS 173-78 (1896 ed. with Moore's Notes of
American Cases).
50. Id. at 173. For modern English rule, see also 1 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND
548 et seq. (3d ed. 1952).
51. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 WaL) 162, 166 (1874).
52. See notes 44 & 45 supra.
53. Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 660 (1927) ; A. COCKmYRN 12.
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to the children born overseas to British subjects.5 There was no
warrant for supposing that the Framers wished to deal less generously
with their own children.55 Therefore, in the absence of other factors,
it would have been relatively easy to find such children "natural-born"
within the contemplation of the Constitution.56
A. THE NATURALIZATION ACT OF 1790
However, complications were produced by subsequent developments. The first such complication arose in the First Congress, elected
immediately after the adoption of the Constitution. The proceedings
of this body, which met so soon after the Constitutional Convention
and included some of the delegates to that Convention, manifestly are
significant in disclosing the intent of the Framers. 5' During the early
discussions of the First Congress, a Mr. Burke observed that "The
case of children of American parents born abroad ought to be provided for, as was done in the case of English parents, in the 12th year
of William III.""5 Thereafter, the Second Session of the First Congress adopted the Act of March 26, 1790, which dealt with this and
other aspects of citizenship.59 The 1790 act, believed by some to
have been a product of Jefferson's fertile mind,6 ° provided for the
acquisition of United States citizenship in three situations: (1) The
naturalization of qualified aliens;61 (2) the derivative naturalization
of the minor children of such naturalized citizens ;"2 and (3) the transmission of citizenship to children born abroad to American citizens.63
The latter provision of the 1790 act was stated in the following language:
And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be
born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the United States.
shall be considered as natural-born citizens: Provided, That the
right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have
64
never been resident in the United States.

54. See notes 41-50 supra. Means, supra note 27, at 27, 113 CONG. Rxc. at H5777,
points out that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention included 22 laymen
and 33 lawyers.
55. Means points out that John Jay, who originally suggested the natural-born
qualification (see note 28 supra), had children who had been born abroad while he
was on diplomatic missions. Means, supra note 27, at 27, 113 CONG. REc. at H5777.
56. See A. COCKBURN 12, in which this leading British author stated "The Law
of the United States of America agrees with our own."
57. Twenty members of the First Congress had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention, and included eight members of the Committee of Eleven, which
drafted the presidential qualification clause. Means, supra note 27, at 28, 113 CONG.
REc. at H5778.
58. 1

ANNALS

OP CONGRESS 1121 (1790).

See also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274

U.S. 657, 661 (1927).
59. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104.
60. See Morse, Natural-Born Citizen of the United States, 66 ALBANY L.J. 90,
100 (1904).
61. For comparable provisions of the current statute, see Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, § 310 et seq., 66 Stat. 239-45, as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1421 et seq. (1964).
62. For comparable provisions of the current statute, see id., §§ 320, 321, 66 Stat.
245, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1432 (1964).
63. For comparable provisions of the current statute, see id., § 301, 66 Stat. 235,
as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
64. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104.
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There are a number of interesting considerations in connection
with the 1790 act. In the first place, there is no record of any debate
in Congress on the provisions dealing with the acquisition5of citizenship
by descent, at birth abroad to American citizen parents. Second, the
statute was captioned "An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." While the caption of a statute does not always fully describe
its content,6" this language would seem to indicate that Congress believed it was legislating under its constitutional mandate "to establish
an uniform rule of naturalization." 7 Such an assumption is debatable,
as I shall show later. It seems equally valid to suggest that this provision of the statute, largely patterned after the English statutory
precedents,6 was enacted to remove any doubt that status as a naturalborn citizen was acquired by a child born abroad to American citizen
parents. 9 And the issue of presidential eligibility is not necessarily
settled, even if we were to accept the thesis that the 1790 act was
entirely a naturalization statute. The Constitution does not speak of
naturalized citizens but rather qualifies only "a natural-born citizen."
It is possible that a person who was regarded in 1790 as a naturalized
citizen could also be deemed natural-born, if he acquired his United
States citizenship at birth. Under the direct mandate of the 1790 act,
such a person was given the rights of a natural-born citizen, whether
or not one believes that his citizenship status resulted from naturalization.70 However, such a hypothesis might still leave open the question
of whether Congress can enlarge or modify the categories of eligible
7
citizens encompassed within the presidential qualification clause.
65. See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 661 (1927).
66. See United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 185 (1956) ; 2 J. SUTH9RLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4802 (3d ed. 1943).
67. Similar captions appeared in the successor legislation of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20,
1 Stat. 414; and April 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153. In Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S.
657, 665 (1927), the Supreme Court observed that in these early statutes "Congress
must have thought that the questions of naturalization and of the conferring of citizen-it
ship on sons of American citizens born abroad were related." The Court's language,
will be observed, differentiates between naturalization and citizenship by descent. One
author urges that the 1790 act's reference to citizens by descent as natural-born
resulted from error in adopting the language of an English statute. P. McElwee,
Natural Born Citizen, unpublished article reprinted in 113 CONG. Rzc. H7255, H7258
(daily ed. June 14, 1967).
68. See notes 42-45 supra. However, in limiting the citizen's power to transmit
to a single generation, the 1790 act did not go as far as the latest English statute
(enacted in 1733), which allowed transmission to two generations. See Weedin v.
Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 661 (1927), which suggests that the 1790 act did not go as
far as the British precedent, "because of the divided allegiance of many during and after
the Revolution."
69. This thesis is supported by Chief Justice Fuller's dissenting opinion in United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 714 (1898), in which he stated that the statute
was "clearly declaratory, passed out of abundant caution to obviate misunderstandings."
The same position is urged in Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356 (1863) and Lynch v.
Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 660 (N.Y. 1844) (statute "a superabundant caution").
70. This concept is strongly urged in Means, supra note 27, at 26-27, 113 CONG.
Ric. at H5777.
71. For a contention that a qualified citizenship would not satisfy the presidential
qualification clause, see 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 354 (2d ed. 1929).
Professor Willoughby's thesis is discussed in the text accompanying notes 174-77 infra.
It has been suggested, however, that legislation disqualifying from public office those
convicted of certain serious criminal offenses (18 U.S.C. §§ 202, 205, 206, 207, 216, 281,
282, 592, 593, 1901, 2071, 2381, 2383, 2385, 2387) adds to the disqualifications prescribed by the Constitution. E. CORWIN, THs PRSIDENT: OFlIC4 AND Pownas 33-34,
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Also noteworthy is the 1790 act's omission to deal with the
citizenship status of persons born in the United States. It can be argued
that Congress may have regarded this subject as beyond its competence, and this argument would support the theory that the 1790 act
was exclusively a naturalization statute. But Congress has not been
reluctant, in later statutes, to record its adherence to the jus soli,
even after that principle was specifically confirmed in the fourteenth
amendment.7 2 As I have indicated, it seems more likely that this
omission to define the status of the native-born was attributable to
a reluctance to face controversial issues, such as the status of the
Negro slaves and the relation between state and national citizenship.7"
It can also be argued that if the legislation dealing with citizens
by descent does not derive from the naturalization clause, then Congress may have exceeded its power in 1790, and in subsequent legislation, in conferring citizenship status on such persons. But such a
contention overlooks the inherent power of a state to define its citizenship. 74 The undefined constitutional references to citizens, the unquestionable recognition of the jus soli in the absence of statute, the
experience of the mother country, and the practice in the United States
all confirm the power of Congress to legislate in this area.
Finally, the 1790 act stated that citizens by descent "shall be
considered as" natural-born citizens. It can perhaps be argued that
this language conferred an inferior status, which would be insufficient
for the purposes of constitutional qualifications.7 But this argument
would hardly be sound, since the statutory language merely reflected
the contemporary usage, which often declared that persons were "considered" or "deemed" to be citizens.7 6 Indeed, the other provisions of
331 (4th rev. ed. 1957); E. FINc sa, THa PRSIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 4-5
(1955). Of course, the application of these statutes to the Presidency has never
been tested.
72. The first statutory recognition of citizenship by birth in the United States
appeared in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (later
Riv. STAT. 1992), which "declared' all persons born in this country to be citizens of the
United States. This statute preceded the fourteenth amendment and, like the
amendment, was enacted to confirm and safeguard the citizenship status of the
liberated Negroes. Modern nationality legislation, enacted long after the fourteenth
amendment, likewise confirms the citizenship status of persons born in the United
States. See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(a), 54 Stat. 1138; Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, § 301(a), 66 Stat. 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1964),
as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66). The fourteenth amendment is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 96 et seq., infra.
73. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
74. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 310-12 (1915) ; Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874); E. CORWIN, THz PRASID-NT: OFVIce AND POWARS
33, 330 (4th rev. ed. 1957) ; H.R. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess.; 1 NATIONALITY LAWS O1'TIH UNITED STATES 10 (Comm. Print 1939)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONALITY LAWS OF THAEUNIM STATSS]. (This document
was prepared by a committee consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Labor and the Attorney General, appointed by President Roosevelt in 1933 to study
the nationality laws of the United States and to propose a codification of those laws.
The efforts of the committee culminated in the enactment of the Nationality Act of
1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.) See notes 72
supra, and 101, 156 & 158 infra.
75. See note 71 supra.
76. Similar language appeared in the Acts of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 and
April 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153. As will appear hereafter, the Act of Feb. 10, 1855,
ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, sought to clear up doubts as to the citizenship status of persons
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the same statute likewise state that persons who acquire citizenship
by their own naturalization or the naturalization of their parents "shall
be considered as" citizens.7
On balance, therefore, it seems likely that the virtually contemporaneous coloration provided by the 1790 act lends support to the
view that the constitutional reference to natural-born citizens was
intended to include those who acquired United States citizenship by
descent, at birth abroad.
B.

THE ACTS OF 1795 AND
BINNEY HYPOTHESIS

1802

AND THE

The 1790 act was repealed in 1795 and was replaced by legislation making substantially the same provisions for the foreign-born
children of American citizens.7 The only significant change was the
statement that such children "shall be considered as citizens of the
United States," omitting their characterization as "natural-born." The
reason for this change does not appear in the legislative proceedings.
Possibly the characterization was deemed archaic or superfluous. Perhaps the legislators wished to avoid any attempt to define the constitutional phrase.7" But these are simply speculations, in the absence of
evidence. The fact is that the "natural-born" designation was eliminated
in the 1795 statute and has not since reappeared in any legislation dealing with citizenship. Indeed, the only American uses of this term are
in the constitutional qualification and the 1790 act. Modern nationality
usage, in the United States and elsewhere, does not include any provision for natural-born citizens." The accepted modern designations,
which will be discussed later, refer only to citizenship at birth and by
naturalization, with the former group divided into native-born citizens
and citizens at birth abroad. 1 Therefore the designation of naturalborn citizens is virtually obsolete and is relevant only because this antiquated term is inscribed in our Constitution.
previously born abroad, and it therefore "declared" such persons to be citizens of the
United States. See notes 92 & 93 infra.
77. Even as late as the Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 5, 34 Stat 1228, a comprehensive citizenship statute provided that a child who acquired citizenship derivatively through the naturalization of his parents "shall be deemed a citizen of the United
States." This loose terminology finally was ended by section 201 of the Nationality
Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat 1138, which declared that specified persons "shall be"
citizens of the United States at birth. The same formulation appears in section 301 (a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, 66 Stat. 235, 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
78. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415.
79. Means points out that Madison, who was chairman of the House committee
which drafted the 1795 act, had become a believer in states' rights, which included a
belief that citizenship should be defined by the states. Means, supra note 27, at 29-30,
113 CONG. Rpc. at H5778. Another author argues that in the modified language of
the 1795 act, Madison sought to correct an error in the 1790 statute. McElwee,
supra note 67.
80. See NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATiEs 7 et seq.; Harvard Law
School Research in International Law, Draft of Convention on Nationality, 23 Am. J.
INT'L L. 13, 27 et seq. (spec. supp. 1929).
81. NATIONALITY LAWS OP THZ UNITED STATES 7 et seq.; Harvard Law School
Research in International Law, supra note 80, at 23. See also notes 104-13 infra and
accompanying text.
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The 1795 act was repealed in 1802 and was replaced by legislation which substantially reaffirmed the prior dispensations regarding
the foreign-born children of American citizens.8 2 However, a rearrangement of language created an unfortunate ambiguity. The 1802 law
stated that "the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens
of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits or jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United
States." This ambiguity apparently aroused little public concern 3
until 1854, when Mr. Horace Binney called attention to it in a celebrated article, which expressed the view that in speaking of "persons
who are or have been citizens" the 1802 act was not prospective, and
that children born abroad to American citizens after the enactment
of that statute did not acquire American citizenship. 4 Mr. Binney was
a distinguished lawyer and scholar, 5 and the views expressed in his
article were endorsed by at least one dictum of the Supreme Court."
Nevertheless, with deference to Mr. Binney, I find his position unpersuasive.'
There is not the slightest evidence of a Congressional
wish to repudiate the consistent practice extending over several centuries, in England and the United States, to recognize citizenship
status by descent. In the absence of such evidence, it seems to me quite
likely that, although the Binney hypothesis appears consistent with the
naked language of the 1802 act, the less rigid and more realistic modern
criteria of interpretation would read the 1802 act as meaning "who
are now or hereafter" rather than finding it limited to the children
of persons who were citizens in 1802. s'
For the purposes of the present discussion, the chief significance
of Mr. Binney's article is his thesis that the common law recognized
only the jus soli - citizenship determined by place of birth - and
that the jus sanguinis - citizenship by descent - was relevant only

to the extent that it was adopted by statute. Again, this is a debatable
premise.8 9 Concededly, as I have shown, there were doubts concerning
the applicability of the jus sanguinis under the early common law. 90
But those doubts were eliminated by statutes enacted in England before
the American Revolution, which became part of the body of law followed in England and passed on to this country. 91 It can be argued,
82. Act of April 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155.
83. However, as I point out in the text accompanying notes 185-96 infra, the
same position was first expounded by Chancellor Kent and was reiterated in
all 14
editions of his Commentaries, from 1827 to 1896.
84. Mr. Binney's article first appeared, unsigned by him and titled The Alienigenae
of the United States, in 2 AM. L. RIerIS~tR 193 (1854). It was later published
as
a separate pamphlet, under the author's name. See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274
U.S. 657,
663 (1927) ; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 665 (1898).
85. See 4 W. LEwis, GRXAT AMRICAN LAwY]RS 197 (1907-1909). Mr. Binney's
life span was 1780-1875.
86. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 673. The Binney thesis
mentioned, but not specifically endorsed, in Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 was also
(1927).
87. Mr. Binney's hypothesis was thoroughly examined and rejected in Ludlam
v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 369-70 (1863).
88. See text accompanying notes 185-96 infra.
89. See notes 39-50 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 38-56 supra and accompanying text.
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I believe, that this total corpus was the common law which this country
inherited, and that it persevered unless specifically modified.92

C.

THE ACT OF

1855

In any event, Mr. Binney's article brought a quick response
from Congress, which passed a new statute in 1 8 5 5 ,93 making an
explicit statement:
That persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the
limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or
shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall
be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens
of the United States . . . (Emphasis added.)
This legislation became Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes and
continued without substantial change, except to confer upon American
women equal right to transmit citizenship, 4 until 19440."

D.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

We come now to another major complication. The first sentence
of the fourteenth amendment, which was approved in 1868," declares:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside.
On its face, this language seems to indicate that there are only
two methods of acquiring United States citizenship, by birth in the
United States and by naturalization in the United States. It has
been argued that this is a comprehensive definition of the methods
of acquiring United States citizenship, and that the amendment "contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization."7
There is no evidence that this amendment sought to provide an
exclusive definition of citizenship. On the contrary, as I have said
on another occasion, "The fourteenth amendment was an aftermath
of the Civil War and the language in question was fashioned to safe92. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
93. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604.

94. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797. This legislation continued the
emancipation of women in regard to citizenship status, which had been commenced by
the Cable Act of Sept. 22, 1922, 42 Stat. 1021. For an expression of the earlier view
see Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). Before 1934 American women could
not transmit citizenship by descent. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
95. Cf. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 6, 34 Stat. 1228-1229, which required
citizens by descent who continued to reside outside the United States to take an oath
of allegiance on their 18th birthday in order to retain the protection of the United
States. See notes 115 & 116 infra.
96. See note 98 infra.
97. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898). For similar
expressions, see notes 159 & 162 infra. Compare however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dictum in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 n. 3 (1958), declaring that the fourteenth amendment "sets forth the two principal modes (but by no means the only
ones) for acquiring citizenship."

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVIII

guard the citizenship rights of Negroes which previously had been
questioned," particularly in the widely condemned Dred Scott decision.98 The purpose was to protect existing citizenship rights, not to
curtail benefits which previously were recognized.99
This purpose was confirmed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which merely "declared" all persons born in the United States to be
citizens of the United States.'
In launching the fourteenth amendment almost immediately thereafter, Congress obviously intended only
to give greater force to the same declaration.'' As pointed out by Mr.
Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark:'0 2
The same Congress, shortly afterwards, evidently thinking it
unwise, and perhaps unsafe, to leave so important a declaration of
rights to depend upon an ordinary act of legislation, which might
be repealed by any subsequent Congress, framed the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. .

.

.As appears from the face

of the amendment, as well as from the history of the times, this
was not intended to impose any new restrictions on citizenship....
It is declaratory in form, and enabling and extending in effect.
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in the same case makes
another telling argument against the theory that the fourteenth amendment was intended as an exclusive definition of citizenship by pointing
out that the amendment refers only to "persons born or naturalized
in the United States." The Chief Justice found it incongruous to suppose that in omitting reference to the status of persons born outside
the United States, the amendment was intended to bar them from
citizenship benefits. 10 3
On its face, the fourteenth amendment did not purport to define
or limit the presidential qualification or the naturalization clauses
98. Gordon, The Citizen and the State, 53 Ggo. L.J. 315, 336 (1965). For discussions of the background and purpose of the fourteenth amendment see United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676, 688 (1898); Slaughterhouse Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873) ; F. Van Dyne, CrrzNsHIP oP 'HE UNrrID STATES
7 et seq.; CONSTITUTION OF THE UITED STATES op AMERICA (1964 ed.), prepared

by Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress and issued as S. Doc. No. 39,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1073 (1964).
99. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). Cf. Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253, 263 (1967), which found an expatriation statute unconstitutional and
declared that in safeguarding the citizenship of the emancipated Negroes, the framers
of the amendment "wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any governmental
unit to destroy."
100. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, later codified as REv. STAT.
§ 1992.
101. However, the fourteenth amendment differed from the Civil Rights Act in
several respects: (1) It substituted "born or naturalized" for "born"; (2) it substituted "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" for "not subject to any foreign power";
(3) as indicated in the text, it said that such persons "are" citizens, while the Act
"declared" them citizens; (4) it specified that those born or naturalized in the United
States were not only citizens of the United States, but also "of the State wherein
they reside"; (5) it eliminated the Act's exclusion of "Indians not taxed." The congressional declaration in the Civil Rights Act, in the absence of direct constitutional
authorization, is of interest in considering possible questions concerning the authority
to pass laws regarding the transmission of citizenship by descent. See notes 72 &
74 supra.
102. 169 U.S. 649, 675-76 (1898).
103. Id. at 714.
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of the Constitution. I believe that even if transmission of citizenship
by descent at birth abroad were regarded as a form of naturalization,
the reasonable and generally accepted view, in the light of the ancient
tradition and the contemporary indicia of purpose, is that in speaking
of citizenship acquired by birth or naturalization in the United States,
the fourteenth amendment did not seek to exclude acquisition at
birth outside the United States. Nor did the amendment attempt to
address the status of such citizens by descent under the presidential
qualification clause of the Constitution. Moreover, since the presidential qualification clause does not, as we have noted, refer to
naturalization, there may still be room for qualification as a naturalborn citizen, even though the process of acquisition at birth abroad was
characterized as naturalization.
It seems to me, therefore, that the fourteenth amendment has
little significant relevance to the appraisal of the presidential qualification clause, and that the amendment's specification of birth or
naturalization in the United States does not exclude other methods of
acquiring United States citizenship.
E.

RECENT LEGISLATION

The latter assumption appears to be shared by Congress in its
recent enactments governing the acquisition of United States citizenship. The most important recent milestone is the Nationality Act of
1940,'" enacted as a codification of the nationality laws of the United
States. This legislation resulted from a five year study by a Cabinet
Committee, comprised of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
and the Secretary of Labor."0 5 The 1940 Code defined naturalization
as the acquisition of nationality after birth."° In proposing this definition, the Cabinet Committee took note of the question "still a subject of debate" whether in referring to "natural-born citizens" the
Constitution includes persons born abroad to American citizens."
Although noting that the discussions in the Convention seemed to
indicate that the naturalization clause in the Constitution was designed
to promote uniformity in conferring American citizenship on aliens,
the Cabinet Committee also acknowledged the possibility, endorsed
by some authorities, that the Framers might have contemplated a
broader connotation of "naturalization," which would include the acquisition of citizenship at birth by children born abroad to American
citizens.' 8 However, the Cabinet Committee stated that this possibility did not outlaw the narrower definition of naturalization (acquisition of citizenship after birth) proclaimed by the 1940 act, "especially
as this meaning is now universally attributed to the word," and since
at least in recent years, persons who acquired United States citizenship
104. Act of Oct 14, 1940, ch. 876 54 Stat. 1137.

105. NATIONALITY LAWS OP TH UNITD STATES vii.
106. Nationality Act of 1940, § 101(c), ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137. A similar definition

appears in Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (23) (1964).
107.

NATIONALITY LAWS O THE UNITrD STATES 3.

108. Id.
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at birth abroad had never been regarded as naturalized." 9 The declarations of the Cabinet Committee regarding the common understanding
and usage were unquestionably correct."'
Pursuant to the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee, the
1940 codification then went on to spell out three major methods of
acquiring United States citizenship: (a) Birth in the United States,
by those subject to the jurisdiction thereof."' This reiterated the
mandate of the fourteenth amendment and the traditional adherence
to the principle of jus soli."2 (b) Birth outside the United States
to American parents." 3 This provision followed another traditional
course - limited acceptance of the principle of jus sanguinis."4 Where
both parents were American citizens at the time of birth and had previously resided in the United States, citizenship was transmitted unconditionally." 5 Where at the time of the child's birth abroad only one
parent was an American citizen who had previously resided in the
United States for specified periods, citizenship was transmitted but was
subject to loss if the child did not reside in the United States for specified periods prior to attaining maturity." 6 (c)
Naturalization of aliens,
1 17
usually through familiar judicial processes.

Of the three major classes of citizens provided for by the 1940
act, the first two acquired United States citizenship at birth, in the
United States or abroad." 8 The third class acquired citizenship through
naturalization after birth.' 9 This formulation was continued, with
some changes in the prescribed conditions, in the 1952 recodification
which is now the controlling legislation. 120 The congressional prescrip109. Id. at 4.
110. See Harvard Law School Research in International Law, supra note 80, at
21, 24.
111. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(a), 54 Stat. 1138.
112. See notes 37 & 38 supra.
113. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(c), (g), 54 Stat. 1138, 1139.
114. See notes 58 et seq., supra and accompanying text.
115. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(c), 54 Stat. 1138.
116. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201(g) & 201(h), 54 Stat. 1139. This
condition subsequent first appeared, in somewhat ambiguous language, in the Act of
May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797. See Lee Chuck Ngow v. Brownell, 152 F.
Supp. 426 (E.D. Wisc. 1957). An earlier version, relating only to possible loss of
diplomatic protection, was Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 6, 34 Stat. 1228. Rueff
v. Brownell, 116 F. Supp. 298 (D.N.J. 1953).
117. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 867, § 301 et seq., 54 Stat. 1140.
118. The introductory clause of section 201 of the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 867,
54 Stat. 1138, said that: "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth." A child who acquires citizenship at birth, whether in the United
States or abroad, sometimes is also invested with another citizenship, and thus
becomes a dual national. For problems of election in such situations see Mandoli v.
Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952);
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
119. See note 106 supra.
120. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, § 301, 66 Stat. 235-36, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964), likewise starts with the declaration that: "The
following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth." Clause (1) of
§ 1401 (a) deals with persons born in the United States. Clauses (3) and (7) deal
respectively with persons born abroad to two citizen parents and to a single citizen
parent. The provisions for loss of citizenship by the latter group upon failure to establish residence in the United States upon attaining maturity are found in § 1401 (b)
and (c). The provisions for naturalization appear in Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, §§ 310-48, 66 Stat. 239-67, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1421-59 (1964).
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tion of three methods of acquiring United States citizenship should be
compared with the fourteenth amendment's recitation of two methods,
and unquestionably expressed the congressional view that the language
of the fourteenth amendment does not forbid provision for acquisition of citizenship, jus sanguinis,
at birth abroad, through a process
121
not described as naturalization.

IV.

JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY EXPRESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The enigma of the natural-born has evoked occasional comment in
this country and has produced divergent opinions. Since there has not
yet been a need to face this problem directly, much of the comment is
somewhat casual and speculative. However, a survey of these expressions will be of interest.
Judicial dicta. An obvious starting point is the United States
Supreme Court's 1898 decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 12
which held that a child born in the United States to alien parents
acquired United States citizenship at birth. The decision turned on
the fourteenth amendment's declaration that "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States.'

2

s

The only question for decision

was whether "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" excluded the children
of aliens. In answering that question negatively, the Court found that
in recognizing the citizenship of all native-born "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," the fourteenth amendment had adopted
the common law precept of jus soli, which conferred nationality upon
all persons born in the realm except children born to foreign monarchs
or ambassadors, or to alien enemies in hostile occupation, or on foreign
public vessels.' 24
Wong Kim Ark was truly a landmark in American constitutional
law, and its basic holding was unquestionably correct. Moreover, its
recognition of universal citizenship conferred on those born in this
land, although adopting a doctrine developed as an adjunct of feudalism,
was eminently suited to -

perhaps even demanded by -

the needs of

a homogeneous nation, which has welcomed millions of immigrants
who sought a life of freedom and opportunity. But in reaching this
salutary conclusion for the Court's majority, Mr. Justice Gray belabored the issues in a long and amazingly discursive opinion. In the
course of his fifty-three page dissertation, Mr. Justice Gray uttered
many pronouncements. Some of these are sound; others are question121. See notes 72, 74 and 101, supra, and accompanying text. See also dictum of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 n. 3 (1958), that the
fourteenth amendment "sets forth the two principal modes (but by no means the
only ones) for acquiring citizenship" and Fee v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 61 (1957). Special problems of possible lack of
"a uniform rule" of naturalization evoked by private legislation purporting
to confer
citizenship on designated individuals are discussed in Bookford, Honorary Citizenship,

12 I.N. Roarm 1 (1963).

122. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
123. For further discussion of the fourteenth amendment, see notes 96 et seq.,
supra, and accompanying text.

124. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 657-60 (1898).
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wonder that this verbose opinion
able; still others are wrong. Small
1 25
still befuddles courts and students.
In projecting his argument, Mr. Justice Gray urged that the common law recognized only the jus soli-citizenship determined by place
of birth. This was a debatable but probably correct estimation of the
early common law, 126 but did not take into account the changes made
by the statutes we have discussed.1a 7 The Justice characterized those
statutes as outside the common law. As I have indicated, in my view it
is more accurate to regard those statutes as changing the common
law. m In any event, they were part of the corpus of the English
law in existence at the time of the Revolution, which was substantially
recognized and adopted by our forefathers. 2 The dissenting opinion
of Chief Justice Fuller, in which Mr. Justice Harlan joined, argued
that the jus sanguinis - citizenship through parentage or descent was the controlling principle of the common law. 130 This too was
wrong. The common law, as it had developed through the years, recognized a combination of the jus soli and the jus sanguinis.131 A similar
combination has always been embraced by the laws of the United
States, except for the possibility of an inadvertent hiatus between 1802
and 1855.m2 And like combinations of both historic principles are today
reflected in the laws of most nations of the world.1'3
Proceeding from his initial thesis, Mr. Justice Gray then stated that
the fourteenth amendment, declaratory of the common law,
has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad
of American parents; and has left this subject to be regulated, as
it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred by the 4Constitution to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization.13

Moreover, in the view of the Justice, the fourteenth amendment
contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth
and naturalization. .

.

. A person born out of the jurisdiction of

the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized
..by authority of Congress... either by declaring certain classes

of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship
125. See Gordon, The Citizen and the State, 53 Gzo. L.J. 315, 335 (1965).
126. See notes 39-50 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
130. 169 U.S. at 705.
131. See notes 36-49 supra and accompanying text. However, the majority opinion
in Wong Kim Ark makes the point that the limitations prescribed in the various
statutes in this country indicate that jus sanguinis was not regarded as the general
rule in this country, in the absence of statute. 169 U.S. at 674. For the opposing view
that these statutes merely declared or modified the common law principle, see note 130
supra and notes 136, 147-56 infra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 51-95 supra and accompanying text, and Weedin v. Chin Bow,
274 U.S. 657, 660, 666 (1927).
133. See Laws Concerning Nationality, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B 14
(1954) with Supplements; Harvard Law School Research in International Law, supra
note 80, at 27-32.
134. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898).
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upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners
individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tri18
bunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.
Chief Justice Fuller's dissenting opinion,186 on the other hand,
believed the statutes regarding the acquisition of citizenship through
descent, by children born abroad to American citizens,
are clearly declaratory, passed out of abundant caution to obviate
misunderstandings.... In my judgment, the children of our citizens born abroad were always3 7natural-born citizens from the
standpoint of this Government.1
It is manifest that these statements of the majority and dissenters
in Wong Kim Ark were dicta, pure and simple. The question before
the Court concerned children born in the United States, and it was
not asked to pass on the status of children born abroad. Several of
the propositions expounded by the majority are, as I have suggested,
debatable. In any event, the majority's opinion did not discuss the
presidential qualification clause of the Constitution and is not necessarily relevant to its interpretation, except possibly by inference. s
In Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court found some comfort in its
earlier decision in Minor v. Happersett. 9 The only question in the
latter case was whether a state could validly restrict voting to male
citizens of the United States. The answer, since expunged by the
nineteenth amendment, 40 was that women could be denied the vote.
In his generalized discussion, Chief Justice Waite observed that "new
citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization."14 The
court mentioned the presidential qualification clause and stated that
it unquestionably included children born in this country of citizen
parents, who "were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished
from aliens or foreigners. 11 42 While this language appears to equate
natives and natural-born, the Court specified that it was not purporting
to resolve any issues not before it. 4
Also mentioned in Wong Kim Ark was the Supreme Court's
famous (perhaps notorious is a better description) decision in the
Dred Scott case."44 Dred Scott actually involved only the citizenship
135. Id. at 702-03.
136. Id. at 705.
137. Id. at 714.
138. All authorities agree that the terms "native" and "natural-born" both refer
to citizenship acquired at the time of birth. Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 666,
667 (1927) ; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 665 (N.Y. 1844) ("both expressions
assume that birth is a test of citizenship . . ."); Morse, Natural Born Citizen of
the United States, 66 ALBANY L.J. 99, 100 (1904).

139. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
140. For historical background of nineteenth amendment, see CONSTrrUTION 0r THE
UNITED STATES or AMERICA (1964 ed.), prepared by Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress, and issued as S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1365 (1964).
141. 88 U.S. at 167.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 168.
144. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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of a runaway Negro slave. Again any generalized expressions affecting
the status of foreign-born citizens would patently be dicta. Moreover,
the Dred Scott holding was one of the factors leading to the Civil War,
and it was directly repudiated by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
fourteenth amendment.' 4 5 In any event, Dred Scott can hardly be
cited as credible authority today. 4 '
I note next two scholarly opinions of the New York courts which
were also mentioned in Wong Kim Ark. Lynch v. Clarke14 1 was
decided in 1844, long before the fourteenth amendment. Since aliens
then could not inherit real property under New York law, United States
citizenship was directly in issue. The court ruled that a child born in
the United States to British parents during their temporary sojourn
acquired United States citizenship at birth under the "original and
ancient" common law rule, which was known to the Framers of the
Constitution and implicitly adopted by them.' 4s Although not involved
in the case before it, the court discussed the status of children born
abroad to American parents. It believed that under the common
law such children had always been recognized as British subjects and
that the English statutes were declaratory of the common law. 4 9 It
regarded the American legislation on this subject as unnecessary and
adopted out of "a superabundant caution," in order to eliminate doubts
which had existed even under the common law.150 And it noted the
presidential qualification clause of the Constitution, compared usages
of "natural-born" and "native-born," and concluded that: "Both expressions assume that birth is a test of citizenship ....
The later New York case of Ludlam v. Ludlam 12 was decided in
1863, likewise, before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.
Here the court actually was confronted with the citizenship status,
also for inheritance purposes, of a child born abroad to an American
citizen father. This was during the period of supposed hiatus in the
citizenship statutes, 1802-1855, of which Horace Binney had written
only a few years earlier. 153 The court noted Mr. Binney's "able" and
"useful" article, but disagreed with his conclusions. 5 4 It agreed that
the question was debatable, but concluded that under the common law
children born abroad to British subjects had been regarded as naturalborn subjects and that the English statutes were declaratory of the
common law.' 55 It found that this common law principle had been
adopted in the United States and that children born abroad to Ameri145. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 676 (1898) ; CONSTITUTION OF
UNITED STATES or AMZRICA (1964 ed.), prepared by Legislative Reference
Service, Library of Congress, and issued as S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
1073-74 (1964) ; F. VAN DYNn, CrrszENsHIP 7 et seq. (1904).
146. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 676.
147. 1 Sandf. Ch. 583 (N.Y. 1844). The opinion was written by Assistant Vice
Chancellor Lewis H. Sandford.
148. Id. at 639.
149. Id. at 659.
150. Id. at 660.
151. Id. at 665.
152. 26 N.Y. 356 (1863). The court's opinion was by Judge Selden.
153. See notes 83-92 supra and accompanying text.
154. 26 N.Y. at 369.
155. Id. at 362-66.
THX
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can fathers acquired United States citizenship at birth, even in the
absence of statute.15 The court's opinion did not discuss the presidential qualification clause.
Of interest, also, is the Supreme Court's 1927 decision in Weedin
v. Chin Bow, 157 which did pass upon the citizenship status of a child

born abroad to an American parent. The Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Taft, held that in order to transmit American citizenship the
American parent must have resided in the United States prior to the
child's birth. The English and American history was extensively reviewed, and the Court found that the basic common law rule of jus soli
had been modified in England by statutes and that: "These statutes
applied to the colonies before the War of Independence."' 8 The Court
also reviewed the statutes in the United States, referred to the apparent
hiatus in the 1802 law, the Horace Binney article, and the 1855 act

enacted pursuant to his suggestion.1 59 It stated that these statutes had
adopted the jus sanguinis, which "emphasizes the fact and time of
birth as the basis of" citizenship, and that under them citizenship is
determined at the time of birth.'
The Court also referred to the possibility, supported by the dissenting opinion in Wong Kim Ark, "that at
common law the children of our citizens born abroad were always

natural-born citizens from the standpoint of this Government, and that
to that extent the jus sanguinis obtained here ... ""'
Finally, I note the more venerable decision of the Supreme Court
in Elk v. Wilkins, 162 which found that members of the Indian tribes
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and did not
acquire United States citizenship at birth. The Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Gray, observed that the "main object" of the first sentence
of the fourteenth amendment was to settle beyond doubt the question
raised in the Dred Scott case regarding the citizenship of Negroes born
in the United States. 1 63 Mr. Justice Gray also noted the presidential
qualification and the naturalization clauses of the Constitution and
stated that under their terms, "The distinction between citizenship by
birth and citizenship by naturalization is clearly marked. . . "

Mr.

Justice Gray also declared, in a dictum he later repeated in Wong Kim
Ark," 5 that the fourteenth amendment "contemplates two sources of
citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization."' 6 6 The
156. The court agreed with Binney's thesis of statutory hiatus after 1802 but
found that citizenship by descent was acquired in the absence of statute. 26 N.Y. at
369-71. See also notes 72, 74, 101 & 112 supra. Of particular interest is the court's
discussion of the well known, but somewhat obscure, holding in Calvin's Case, 7 Rep.
1, 2 S.T. 559 (1608). See 26 N.Y. at 363-64.
157. 274 U.S. 657 (1927).
158. Id. at 660.
159. Id. at 662-64.
160. Id. at 666-67.
161. Id. at 670.
162. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
163. Id. at 101.
164. Id.
165. See notes 134-38 supra.
166. 112 U.S. at 101.
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only holding of Elk v. Wilkins, of course, was that American Indians
did not acquire United States citizenship by birth in this country.
This holding has since been expunged by direct statutory mandates
conferring citizenship status. 8 7 These statutes, parenthetically, supply
an additional confirmation of the belief of Congress that the Constitution does not limit its authority to define citizenship status. 168
Patently there is little aid in these judicial expressions. 169 None
of them directly addresses the presidential qualification clause of the
Constitution. Their discussions generally concern the historical antecedents of citizenship by descent and the extent of that doctrine's acceptance in the United States before and after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.
Scholarly views. The scholarly expressions approach the problem more directly, but are equally inconclusive. Professor Corwin,
in his definitive book on the Presidency,'1 0 takes the position that the
naturalization clause of the Constitution relates only to the award of
citizenship to aliens and that the presidential qualification clause
refers to those who became citizens at birth. He finds that the authority to grant citizenship to the latter group is inherent in the
sovereign national power to determine who shall be members of the
society, but does not consider the effect of the fourteenth amendment.

He then observes

:171

Should then, the American people ever choose for President a
person born abroad of American parents, it is highly improbable
that any other constitutional agency would venture to challenge
their decision.
Similar views are expressed by Professor Fincher in an undocumented and less authoritative book on the Presidency.1 7 2 He notes
the uncertainty regarding the eligibility of foreign-born children of
American citizens, and states :173
It is generally assumed, however, that should such a person
become a candidate for the Presidency, few would question his
eligibility. . . . Moreover, any doubts on that score would be
settled by American voters, should he ever be nominated for the
Presidency.
167. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, § 301 (a) (2), 66 Stat. 235,
8 U.S.C. 1401(a) (2) (1964) ; Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(b), 54 Stat. 1138.
168. See notes 72, 74, 101 & 156 supra.
169. Among the lower court expressions are Zimmer v. Acheson, 191 F.2d 209
(10th Cir. 1951) (repeated the language regarding the two exclusive methods of
acquiring citizenship, and found that a citizen by descent is a naturalized citizen);
Schaufus v. Attorney General, 45 F. Supp. 61, 66-67 (D. Md. 1942) (dictum quoted
Wong Kim Ark on two exclusive methods of acquiring citizenship); United States
ex rel. Guest v. Perkins, 17 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D.D.C. 1936) (dictum that child born
overseas to American mother is not natural born citizen).
170. E. CORWIN, THs PMESMZNT: OPPICS AND PowERs 32-34 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
171. Id. at 33.
172. E. FINcHER, THs PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATZS 3-5 (1955).
173. Id. at 4, 5.
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Professor Willoughby, in his somewhat ponderous tome on constitutional law, 1 74 acknowledges the uncertainty regarding the span of
the presidential qualification clause. He would regard as natural-born
those entitled to claim United States citizenship without any prior
declaration on their part. Since the statute then in effect required the
foreign-born citizen to take an oath of allegiance upon attaining
majority, he would not deem them natural-born. Willoughby's thesis
is questionable for a number of reasons. First, his theory regarding
qualified citizenship, although not inherently unreasonable, has no support whatever in the language or antecedents of the Constitution.
175
Second, he is wrong in his reading of the 1907 citizenship act.
That statute conferred citizenship absolutely upon children born abroad
to American fathers and provided that their failure to take an oath
of allegiance at majority would deprive them of diplomatic protection,
not of citizenship. 1 6 Later statutes have confirmed the absolute acquisition of citizenship at birth by children born abroad to American
parents, but have provided for loss of such citizenship under specified
circumstances if only one of the parents is a United States citizen
when the child is born.' 77 Finally, Willoughby likewise does not consider the possible effect of the fourteenth amendment.
The natural-born qualification is also discussed by Justice Story
in his well known Commentaries on the Constitution, as follows :178
This permission of a natural citizen to become President is an
exception from the great fundamental policy of all governments,
to exclude foreign influence from their executive councils and
duties. It was doubtless introduced (for it has now become by
lapse of time merely nominal, and will soon become wholly extinct)
out of respect to those distinguished revolutionary patriots who
were born in a foreign land, and yet had entitled themselves to high
honors in their adopted country. A positive exclusion of them
from the office would have been unjust to their merits and painful
to their sensibilities. But the general propriety of the exclusion
of foreigners, in common cases, will scarcely be doubted by any
sound statesman. It cuts off all chances for ambitious foreigners,
who might otherwise be intriguing for the office; and interposes
a barrier against those corrupt interferences of foreign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the most serious
evils upon the elective monarchies of Europe. Germany, Poland,
and even the pontificate of Rome, are sad but instructive examples
of the enduring mischiefs arising from this source.
It is difficult to follow Story's reasoning. The second and third
sentences of the above quotation are addressed to the natural-born
174. W. WILLOUGHBY,
(2d ed. 1929).

THP CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THZ UNITED STATES

353-54

175. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 6, 34 Stat. 1228.
176. Lee Chuck Ngow v. Brownell, 152 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1957); Rueff v.
Brownell, 116 F. Supp. 298 (D.N.J. 1953).
177. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
178. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1479 (5th ed. 1891).
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qualification but relate only to those who were citizens at the adoption
of the Constitution. However, the first sentence, at least inferentially,
seems to regard citizens by descent as qualified under the natural-born
qualification. Also of interest is Story's dictum regarding the need
to exclude "ambitious foreigners, who otherwise might be intriguing
for the office." This observation seems consistent with the views of
John Jay, which probably resulted in the adoption of the natural-born
qualification.17 9 Of course, Story, first writing in 1833, likewise does
not take into account any possible effect of the fourteenth amendment.
I note also Bancroft's History of the Constitutional Convention.
Bancroft comprehensively explores the development of the Convention's
edicts regarding the Presidency.'8 He notes the Committee on Detail's
insertion, almost at the last hour, of the presidential qualification
clause, which was accepted by the Convention without any explanation
or debate.' 8 ' Curiously enough, Bancroft does not mention the natural8 2
born qualification and thus sheds no light on its proper interpretation.
Next, I turn to Chancellor Kent's famous Commentaries. At one
point Kent seemed to equate natural-born with native-born and believed
(like Story) 8 8 that the purpose of the presidential qualification clause
was to exclude "ambitious foreigners."'8 4 At another point, Kent reviewed the development in England of the rule that foreign-born children of British subjects were regarded as natural-born. However, he
deemed their rights in this country dependent on statute and declared
that there was a regrettable hiatus after 1802 in conferring citizenship
benefits on children born abroad to American parents.'8 5 We have seen
that Horace Binney later expounded the same hypothesis and doubtless
led to the clarification of the statute in 1855.186 The Kent-Binney
theory of hiatus in providing for such children was positively endorsed
by Mr. Justice Gray in Wong Kim Ark. 7 and mentioned by Chief
Justice Taft in Chin Bow,' s but neither case involved the status of
children born abroad during the period of the alleged hiatus. The KentBinney theory was repudiated by the New York courts in Lynch v.
Clarke'8 9 and Ludlam v. Ludlam,' the latter of which did involve the
status of a child born abroad during the period of the alleged hiatus.
179. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
180. 2 G. BANCROFT, HISTORY
UNITED STATES 165 et seq. (1882).
181. Id. at 192-93.

182.
183.
184.
185.

01' THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE

Id.
See notes 178 & 179 supra and accompanying text.
1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 273 (1st ed. 1826).
2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 52 (1st ed. 1827). Kent asserted that the 1802

act "is clearly not prospective in its operation." Writing in 1827, Kent did not have
the benefit of the later and more thorough examinations in Lynch v. Clarke, Ludlam
v. Ludlam, and by Horace Binney. See notes 147-56 supra and accompanying text.
Note 150 supra indicates that later editions of Kent largely ignored these and other
developments.
186. See notes 84-92 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 122-46 supra and accompanying text. Citing Kent and Binney,
Mr. Justice Gray also asserted that the 1802 act "clearly did not include foreign-born
children of any person who became a citizen since its enactment." 169 U.S. at 673.
188. See notes 157-61 supra and accompanying text.
189. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
190. See note 152 supra and accompanying text. As indicated there, Judge Selden
of the New York Court of Appeals, writing a few years after the Binney article and
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Kent and Binney were towering figures in American law'
and
one hesitates to dispute them. But Kent was wrong in his support,
through all fourteen editions, of the doctrine of indissoluble allegiance," 2
and I believe he was also wrong in finding that there was a hiatus in providing for the citizenship of foreign-born children. It does not, in my
view, seem reasonable to suppose that Congress intended to deny benefits to children born abroad between 1802 and 1855 to American parents
who were not citizens in 1802. As I have indicated, I believe the 1802
act can reasonably be read as extending to children born abroad after
its enactment. 93 And the theory of hiatus seems inconsisent with the
language of the 1855 act, enacted to remove the ambiguity pointed out
by Binney, which stated that children previously born abroad to American parents "are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States."'9 4
The thrust of this language seems declaratory, apparently designed to
recognize existing citizenship status. 19 5 It is interesting to note that
later editions of Kent, including the 12th edition by 0. W. Holmes, Jr.,
in 1873, continued to deplore the hiatus even though Congress had
removed all doubts by the 1855 statute. 19 6 In any event, this controversy as to the alleged hiatus is relevant to our discussion only insofar
as it may demonstrate whether there was an unbroken national policy
to confer citizenship on children born abroad to American citizens.
Another well known authority on American citizenship is Van

Dyne, who recognized the "debatable question" whether the presidential
qualification clause was intended to declare the common law doctrine.
However, he took the position that a child who acquired United States
citizenship at birth abroad to American parents "is a natural-born

citizen of the United States."' 9 7
Gettys, author of another well-regarded treatise, takes note of the
prevailing uncertainty and states:
While there has yet been no occasion to obtain official opinion
or decision on this point it is very probable that such opinion would
the 1855 act, found Binney's article "able" and "useful," but stated that after examining the authorities cited by Binney, "I am satisfied they do not sustain his conclusion."
191. See note 85 supra.

192. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 49 (1st ed. 1827). Later editions modified a flat
endorsement of perpetual allegiance to describe it as the "better view" (7th ed.) and
the "better opinion" (11th ed.). For description of the early doubts and ultimate
rejection of the doctrine of indissoluble allegiance in the United States see Gordon,
The Citizen and the State, 53 GEo. L.J. 315, 318 et seq. (1965).

193. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
194. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604. See notes 82-88 supra and
accompanying text.
195. The view that the 1855 act was declaratory is also expressed in E. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERs 33, 330 n. 6 (4th rev. ed. 1957). It is also
possible to accept the hiatus theory and to find that a common law principle of jus
sanguinis persevered in the absence of statute. See CORWIN, id. and Ludlam v. Ludlam,
notes 152-56 supra and accompanying text.

196. 2 J. KNT, COMMENTARIES 53 (1st ed. 1827). Although the alleged hiatus
is deplored in all editions of Kent, the l1th Edition has a footnote reference to the
1855 act. Later editions (including the 12th by 0. W. Holmes, Jr.) omitted even
this footnote reference.
197. F. VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1904).
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be in harmony with the early law, which attributes the status of
'natural-born' to those persons acquiring United States citizenship
jure sanguinis198
The excellent treatise on the Constitution prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress remarks that the
question "has been frequently mooted" and declares that the answer
depends on whether the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment
"is to be given an inclusive or exclusive interpretation."1'9 At another
point, the treatise states that there are three categories of citizens under
the fourteenth amendment, the first being "those who are born citizens,
of whom there are two classes, those who were born in the United States
and those who were born abroad of American parentage.""'
There have also been two widely-separated law review discussions.
The first was by Alexander Porter Morse, 201 who had earlier been
author of a text on citizenship. 0 2 Mr. Morse's discussion is brief and
unannotated and somewhat pontifical in its assertions, although it displays familiarity with the subject matter. It was his view that the
purpose of the presidential qualification clause was to prescribe that
anyone who was born a citizen would be eligible, and that a person
who acquired United States citizenship at birth abroad to American
parents satisfies the constitutional qualification.
A later and more carefully prepared comment in the Cornell Law
Quarterly also took the position that persons who acquired United
States citizenship at birth abroad are "natural-born" within the meaning of the constitutional requirement. 0 3
I note also several recent expressions. Thus, two studies reaching conflicting conclusions have appeared in the CongressionalRecord.
The first is an article by Cyril C. Means, Jr., reprinted from U.S. News
and World Report. Regrettably undocumented, this paper shows considerable awareness of the deliberations of the 1787 Constitutional
Convention. It is the author's conclusion that the Framers intended
to exclude only persons who had not been born citizens and that those
who acquired United States citizenship at birth abroad are eligible
for the Presidency.2 0 4 A contrary view is adopted in a previously
198. C. GErrYs, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP Or THE UNITED STATES 176 (1934).
199. CO sTITUTION Or THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1964 ed.), issued as
S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 435 (1964). The original 1952 edition of this
work was edited for the Legislative Reference Service by Edward S. Corwin. The
1964 edition was edited by Norman J. Small and Lester S. Jayson.
200. Id. at 1073.
201. Morse, Natural-Born Citizen of the United States - Eligibility for the Office

of President, 66 ALBANY L.J. 99 (1904).
202. A. MORSE, CITIZENSHIP (1881). This treatise did not discuss the presidential

qualification clause. However, in his preface (p. 1), the author equates natural-born
with native-born, in language somewhat inconsistent with his later article. A fairly
contemporaneous treatise, P. WEBSTER, LAW oF CITzENsHn (1891), does not discuss
the presidential qualification clause or the designation of "natural-born." However,

he regards jus sanguinis as the natural rule and finds that residence abroad by Ameri-

can citizens does not change the right of descent of their children.
203. Freedman, PresidentialTimber: ForeignBorn Children of American Parents,

35 CORN9LL L.Q. 357 (1950).
204. Means, supra note 27, at 30, 113 CONG. Rnc. at H5779.
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unpublished study by Pinckney G. McElwee appearing in the Congressional Record. Although the author's research is fairly extensive,
his conclusions are dogmatic and somewhat rigid. It is his view that
citizenship of a child born abroad to American parents can be acquired only through naturalization and that such a naturalized citizen
cannot become President.2 °5
Divergent opinions are also expressed in two articles recently
appearing in the New York Law Journal. The first, by Isidor Blum,
is extensively documented, but its approach is somewhat disorganized
and unperceptive. It is the author's view that "natural-born" is synonymous with "native-born" and that a child born abroad to American
parents is unqualified. 20 6 This view is rebutted in a second article in the
same journal by Eustace Seligman. This is a rather superficial study
by a partisan of Governor Romney. It concludes that foreign-born
children of American citizens do not acquire their citizenship through
naturalization 2and
that they qualify for the Presidency as "natural07
born" citizens.
Dictionary definitions of "natural-born" are also conflicting. Some
regard it as status acquired by birth, 208 some as status by birth within
the dominion or allegiance,20 9 and some are silent.210 Of course, a
problem of this dimension will be resolved only by an understanding
of the constitutional
purpose, "rather than by reliance upon dictionary
21
definitions." '
V.

How THE DILEMMA CAN BE RESOLVED
Manifestly, the best way to remove the doubts is to amend the
Constitution. However, this is a slow process and is seldom invoked.
The tendency has been to postpone the resolution of difficult problems
and to resort to the amendment process only when a feeling of urgency
has developed. In recent years, there have been several proposals for
a constitutional amendment, but none of these has received active
consideration.212
Possibly Congress might pass a clarifying statute, but the value
of such a statute seems dubious. At most, it would express the opinion
of the present Congress concerning the proper construction of the
Constitution and 218
would not be binding on the other two branches of
our Government.
205. McElwee, supra note 67, 113 CONG. Rzc. at H7260.
206. Blum, Is Gov. George Romney Eligible to Be PresidentP, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 16,
1967, at 1, col. 7; Oct. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
207. Seligman, A Brief for Gov. Romney's Eligibility for Presidency, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 15, 1967, at 1, col. 7, reprinted in 113 CONG. Rc. at S17875 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1967).
208. WEBSTER, THIRD Nnw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1630 (1961).

14 C.J.S. Citisens § 1, at 1128 n. 22 (1939).

See also

209. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (4th ed. 1951) ; CYCLOPEDic LAW DICTIONARY
681 (2d ed. 1922).
210. 3 BOuVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 2297 (Rawle's third rev. 1914).

211. Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 418 (1948).

212. H.J. Rns. 259, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.J. IRs. 28, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949); H.J. RUs. 214, 205, 517, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.J. Rts. 571,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; H.J. REs. 397, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).

213. However, as Professor Corwin points out, Congress may apparently add to
the eligibility requirements of the presidential qualification clause, e.g., by its dis-
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There remains the traditional method of construing the Constitution through a ruling of the federal courts. Under the Constitution,
those courts exercise judicial power which extends "to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution. 21 4 However, until
an actual controversy develops there is no possibility of obtaining a
ruling by the federal courts. 21 5 Those courts have always interpreted
their constitutional mandate as precluding the rendering of advisory
opinions. 16 And they have not regarded this limitation as modified
by the statutory authority for declaratory judgments. The statute re' 21 7
stricts such declaratory judgments to cases of "actual controversy.
This authorization has been read somewhat restrictively, and declaratory relief has usually been granted only to one actually threatened with
sanctions or with
imminent impairment of status or of personal or
218
property rights.

Thus, the alternative has been for those who aspire to the Presidency to press their candidacy in the belief that citizenship acquired
at birth abroad qualifies them as natural-born citizens. Since no such
candidacy has until now developed beyond the speculative stage, there
has not yet been any occasion to test this belief. 21

Such a test could

have developed when the candidacy of Governor Romney was being
actively pressed. Now that he has withdrawn from the presidential
contest, a test will be deferred until some future candidate in a similar
situation pursues his candidacy to the advanced stage of a preference primary or an election ballot. I shall not attempt to chart in detail all the
possible avenues which could be explored in seeking such a test. However, a few major routes are readily apparent.
The election mechanisms established by the various states may
provide the initial opportunity for obtaining a judicial ruling. Every
220
state has an election board or officer to supervise the election process.
Contests could develop at two stages in that process. In the first place,
some states now provide for a presidential preference primary to
select delegates to the national nominating conventions of the major
political parties.2 1 Often, it is necessary to file petitions for delegates
committed to a particular candidate. A state election board usually
qualification from public office of those convicted for certain criminal offenses.
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFVICE AND POWERs 33-34 (4th rev. ed. 1957). See also
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1479 (5th ed. 1891). See note
66 supra.
214. U.S. CONST'. art. 3, § 2.
215. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
216. See International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) ; Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) ; Nukk v. Shaughnessy, 350 U.S. 869 (1955).
217. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
218. See notes 215 & 216 supra.
219. According to contemporaneous newspaper accounts, a state court suit challenging the qualification of Barry Goldwater on the ground that he was not a naturalborn citizen was dismissed.
220. See In re Application of Andersen, 264 Minn. 157, 119 N.W.2d 1 (1962).
E.g., 29 C.J.S. Elections § 55 (1965).
221. For description of presidential preference primaries in the 1960 and 1964 presidential elections, see T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT (1960), THE MAKING
OF THE PRESIDENT (1964).
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can pass on the eligibility of one who seeks to appear on the ballot. 222
Its ruling for or against the qualifications of a particular candidate can
be challenged in the state's courts. The books are full of state cases
involving disputes as to various aspects of primary elections."' 3 And
in recent years the federal courts have underscored their interest in the
federal constitutional aspects of state elections, even when they only
concern party primaries. 224 Indeed, a number of statutes implement the
authority of federal courts to intervene in election disputes where
deprivation of rights is alleged.22 5
Since interpretation of the presidential qualification clause involves a federal constitutional question, such an issue would unquestionably wind up in the federal courts, either by an initial suit in such
courts, 226 by removal of actions commenced in state courts, 227 or by
Supreme Court review of a state court's decision.2 28 And it is not
inconceivable that a candidate, as well as the party apparatus itself,
might encourage an administrative ruling at the state level in order to
justify a "friendly" suit seeking a judicial pronouncement. 229 Indeed,
an adverse ruling would be an obvious predicate for a declaratory judgment suit in the federal courts.230
If a judicial determination can be obtained, an early presentation of
the issue in connection with a primary election would be desirable. If
there is no judicial intervention at that level, the likelihood of a
judicial ruling doubtlessly would diminish. It would still be possible, of
course, to challenge the qualifications of a party's nominee through various state remedies seeking to strike his name from the ballot in par222. See 29 C.J.S. Elections §§ 55, 130 (1965).
223. See 29 C.J.S. Elections §§ 111-29 (1965).
224. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)
(discriminatory tests);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (declaratory judgment and injunction, state
legislature) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (same, congressional redistricting) ; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (same, county unit vote for legislature) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (declaratory judgment, reapportionment) ;
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (declaratory judgment and injunction,
gerrymandering); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(declaratory judgment,
alleged discrimination in state primary); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(suit for damages, alleged discrimination in state primary) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73 (1932) (same). Cf. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966) (state process
for electing governor held not to violate due process) ; South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966) (federal restrictions on state voting practices upheld) ; McDougall
v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948)
(state petition requirement held constitutional).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 1344 (1964) gives United States district courts original jurisdiction of any civil action to recover any office, "except that of elector of President or
Vice President, United States Senator, Representative in or delegate to Congress,
or member of a state legislature;" Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, § 3,
79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (Supp. I, 1965), authorizes certain remedies in actions
brought by the Attorney General to enforce guarantees of the fifteenth amendment;
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) gives United States district courts original jurisdiction of
actions to vindicate constitutional rights; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964) creates remedy for
enforcement of constitutional rights where other remedies are inadequate.
226. See notes 219 & 225 supra.
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1964); F. FgRRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
135-36 (1926).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1964).
229. The New York Times of November 1, 1967, at 28, noted the possibility that
a court test of Governor Romney's eligibility might be presented by a friendly or
adverse suit in connection with the New Hampshire primary, early in 1968. However,
no such court test had developed before Mr. Romney's withdrawal on February 29, 1968.
230. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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ticular states. 23 1 But once a major party becomes committed to a
Presidential candidate, the stakes become so momentous that the courts
might hesitate to intervene. Nevertheless the possibility of a judicial
contest at this stage of the election process cannot be discounted. There
is no certainty that the Supreme Court, in its present activist mood,
would shrink from entering what some may regard as a "political
thicket" to decide any controversy, merely because the decision will have
far-reaching consequences. 2- 2 Therefore it is conceivable that a judicial
holding might be obtained, particularly if it is favorable to the candidate.
Finally, it may develop that there has been no judicial determination and that a person with the disputed qualifications is actually elected
President. Some ingenious soul might resort to judicial proceedings
to restrain the electoral college from voting or to block the new President's induction, but it hardly seems likely that such an effort would
be seriously regarded. More significant is the possibility that after
the new President takes office someone may seek to oust him through
the ancient writ of quo warranto- challenging an office holder's right
to his office - or its modern equivalents. 33 Although it has no specific
statutory sanction, such a writ is still recognized in federal practice. 34
But at this stage of the election process, the possibility of a judicial
expression is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent. In the first place,
a person seeking to launch such a contest would have to overcome the
seemingly insuperable hurdle of legal standing to sue. In the federal
practice his lack of direct interest would seem fatal.235 More importantly,
an effort to vitiate the free choice of the American people in electing
a President would entail the gravest consequences to the national
security and order and to the balance of authority in our scheme of
government. Although courts have adjudicated controversies involving
titles to governorships and other high offices, 36 it seems likely that at
231. See notes 220-25 supra.
232. Mr. Justice Frankfurter first used the famous "political thicket" phrase as a
talisman of restraint in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). As I have
indicated in note 224 supra, the Supreme Court thereafter did not shrink from entering

many thickets. See also Means, supra note 27, at 30, 113 CONG. REC. at H5779.
233. See F. Ftms, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 125-27 (1926) ; G. McCRARY,
ELECTIONS 280-94 (4th ed. 1897) ; F. MscHEM, PUBLIC OFFICERS 139, 304-06 (1890) ;
H. PAINE, ELEctiONs 709-12 (1890). As the foregoing authorities indicate, excessively
technical requirements caused the ancient writ to fall into disuse and it has been
generally supplanted by an information in the nature of quo warranto.
234. See FZD. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2) ; 7 J. MooRr, FxEDRAL PRAcTicE
81.05(5),
at 4438 (2d ed. 1966); Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1344 (1964), which gives the U.S. district
courts original jurisdiction over actions to recover an office, "except that of elector of
President or Vice President, United States Senator, Representative in or delegate to
Congress, or member of a state legislature," where discriminatory denial of the right
to vote is alleged. Of course, authority for invocation of quo warranto could also be
premised on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964). See F. FxRRIs, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL RtMEDrMS 135 (1926).
235. The rule is expressed in the leading case of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923). For criticisms of this limitation of judicial inquiry, see 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVt LAW TRATISE § 22.09, at 243 (1958).
Cf. Flast v. Gardner, now
awaiting decision in the United States Supreme Court, No. 416, October Term, 1967.
236. See G. McCRARY, ErectioNs 288-89 (4th ed. 1897), which expresses the view
that the courts have authority to determine the title to the highest offices. In Boyd v.
Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892), the Supreme Court, in holding that an
elected Governor was a citizen of the United States and thus entitled to his office,
reversed a state court judgment ousting him from the office. A recent and widely
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this stage the federal courts would regard it as the type of political
controversy 237 in which they should not intercede. 23 ' Another possible,
but far-fetched, line of attack might seek to challenge the validity of laws
enacted over such a President's signature.23 9
It is quite possible, of course, that the courts might find the issue
political and nonjusticiable at any milestone of consideration. However,
the climate for obtaining judicial guidance would be infinitely better if
such a ruling is solicited at the earliest stages of the electoral process,
24
before an overpowering national interest for stability has developed.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

My study of this 180 year enigma leads me to the following conclusions.
1. The reference to "natural-born" in the presidential qualification clause must be considered in the light of the English usage, well
known to the Framers of the Constitution. The English common law,
particularly as it had been declared or modified by statute, accorded
full status as natural-born subjects to persons born abroad to British
subjects.
2. Although the evidence of intent is slender, it seems likely that
the natural-born qualification was intended only to exclude those who
were not born American citizens, but acquired citizenship by naturalization. The Framers were well aware of the need to assure full citizenship rights to the children born to American citizens in foreign countries. Their English forebears had made certain that the rights of
such children were protected, and it is hardly likely that the Framers
intended to deal less generously with their own children. The evidence, although not overwhelming, unquestionably points in the direction of such generosity.
3. This gloss of prior history and usage is not dulled, I believe,
by the Naturalization Act of 1790 or by the fourteenth amendment.
The 1790 act, enacted soon after the Constitutional Convention, recognized such persons as natural-born citizens. The fourteenth amendment, adopted primarily to confirm the full citizenship denied to Negroes
by the Dred Scott decision, did not refer to "natural-born" citizens, did
not purport to limit or define the presidential qualification clause of
publicized election contest involving an election for governor was In re Andersen, 264
Minn. 257, 119 N.W.2d 1 (1962).
237. Comprehensive recent discussions of the political controversy doctrine will
be found in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-37, 267-318 (1962) ; Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37 (1964) (act of state doctrine).
238. See the observations of Professor Corwin and Fincher quoted in text accompanying notes 171 & 173 supra; F. MncHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERs 312-14
(1890) (remedy discretionary, and court may withhold relief if disastrous consequences
would result. However, the Supreme Court's direct confrontation with the President
in the Steel Seizure Case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952)).
239. See Means, supra note 27, at 30, 113 CONG. RIc. at H5779.
240. Even if an elected official is disqualified by the courts, it does not follow that
the office can be claimed by his defeated opponent. See G. MCCRARY, ELtCrIONS 248
(4th ed. 1897).
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the Constitution, and did not, in my estimation, bar a construction of
that clause to include children born abroad to American parents.
4. Nor is such a construction foreclosed by questionable dicta in
United States v. Wong Kim Ark and other Supreme Court decisions.
These dicta are not addressed to the presidential qualification clause
and cannot control its construction.
Having endorsed these conclusions, I must concede that the picture
is clouded by elements of doubt. These doubts will unquestionably persist until they are eliminated by a constitutional amendment, a definitive judicial decision, or the election and accession of a President who
was "natural-born" outside the United States.241 The withdrawal of
Governor Romney has ended the possibility that clarification would
emerge as a result of his candidacy. Perhaps such clarification will
develop from some future candidacy of another citizen in the same
situation. On the other hand, it may eventually be necessary to amend
the Constitution in order to remove the ambiguity.
It is unfortunate that doubts remain on an issue of such vital
importance to many Americans. We live in a fluid and ever diminishing
world. The interests of our nation and its people are constantly expanding, and millions of Americans reside for short or long periods
in foreign countries.24 2 They are there in pursuit of inspiration, enlightenment, profit, pleasure, repose or escape. Indeed, the vast majority
of the overseas Americans are there in the service of their government
or of American concerns or organizations.243 All of these have a right
to retain their status as American citizens while they live abroad. One
can perceive no sound reason for shutting off aspiration to the Presidency for the children born to them while they are temporarily sojourning in foreign countries.24 4
241. Of interest are the questions raised concerning Mr. Hoover's eligibility, since
he had not resided in the United States for fourteen years prior to his accession to the
Presidency. However, no legal challenge to Mr. Hoover's title to office ever developed.
See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERs 33, 330 n. 7 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
242. NnwswEEK, Nov. 28, 1966, at 43-44.
243. Our nationality laws presently confer various benefits on those abroad in the
service of the United States or American organizations. Thus a person abroad in the
United States Army or as an employee of the United States Government or an international organization thereby satisfies the requirement for physical presence in the
United States prerequisite to transmission of citizenship by descent where only one
parent is a citizen. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, § 301 (a) (7),
66 Stat. 236, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (7) (Supp. II, 1965-66). An alien
absent abroad in the service of the United States Government or specified American
organizations, or an international organization is exempt from certain residency
requirement prerequisite to naturalization. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
ch. 447, § 316(b), 66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b) (1964). The alien wife of an
American citizen regularly stationed abroad in similar employments can obtain expeditious naturalization. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, § 319(b),
66 Stat. 244, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b) (1964); see also Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 447, §§ 353, 354, 66 Stat. 270, 271, as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1485, 1486 (1964), which exempts from loss of nationality resulting from residence
abroad in similar employments. However, the latter provisions are now irrelevant
since the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the basic statute for expatriation
through residence abroad. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
244. It was estimated in 1955 that one out of every two hundred born Americans
acquired his citizenship at birth abroad to American parents. Means, supra note 27,
at 26, 113 CONG. REc. at H5777.

